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CASES NOTED
involved.42 The court, treating the case as one of first impression, gave no
specific criteria for future reference other than that of announcing a gen-
eral rule without specifying what the government must show to negate the
newsman's privilege.4" It is submitted that the court employed question-
able authority to support general statements in order to achieve the de-
sired result.44 Had the court utilized more precise legal reasoning to
develop the opinion with a firm foundation, this decision could have had
far-reaching effects. However, later decisions have either rejected the ex-
tended interpretation of "freedom of the press" and followed prior prece-
dent45 or have limited the application of Caldwell to the factual situation
presented.4 6
R. FRED LEWIS
EXTENSION OF LIABILITY IN THE BAILMENT FOR HIRE
Plaintiff, United Airlines, was in need of a method by which pas-
sengers requiring wheelchairs could be loaded onto and unloaded from its
aircraft. This need was revealed to the defendant, W. E. Johnson Equip-
ment Co., Inc., and the two entered into a month-to-month lease agree-
ment for a forklift type hoist, with lessor furnishing all maintenance, re-
pair, and service. Fifteen days later, while a passenger was deplaning, the
hoist fell and the passenger was severely injured. Plaintiff settled with the
passenger and then brought suit against the Johnson Equipment Company
for indemnification, alleging negligent maintenance and breach of implied
42. The court stated: "It is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black
Panther Party. . . ." 434 F.2d at 1090.
43. See note 8 supra.
The only suggestion of the Government's burden to negate such a privilege was advanced
by the reporter.
.. . the Government must show at least: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe the journalist has information, (2) specifically relevant to an identified episode
that the grand jury has some factual basis for investigating as a possible violation of
designated criminal statutes within its jurisdiction, and (3) that the government has
no alternative sources of the same or equivalent information whose use would not
entail an equal degree of incursion upon First Amendment freedoms. Once this
minimal showing has been made, it remains for the courts to weigh the precise de-
gree of investigative need that thus appears against the demonstrated degree of harm
to First Amendment interests involved in compelling the journalist's testimony.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970). See People v. Dohrnm, Case
No. 69-3808, May 20, 1970, Cir. Ct. Cook County, Calif., Criminal Division.
44. See note 31 supra.
45. See, In re Pappas, 39 U.S.L.W. 2444 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1971).
We adhere to the view that there exists no constitutional newsman's privilege, either
qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury.
In re Pappas, supra at 2444.
46. United States v. Calley, 39 U.S.L.W. 2463 (Army General Court Martial, 5th Jud.
Cir. 1971).
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warranty of fitness for intended use. The trial court directed a verdict for
defendant on the implied warranty count, the jury found in defendant's
favor on the negligence issue and judgment was entered. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed.1 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of Florida, held, affirmed: In the absence of a contrary agreement,
a lessor who has reason to know the purpose for which the leased chattel
is to be used and reason to know that the lessee has relied upon the lessor's
judgment in furnishing a suitable chattel, impliedly warrants that the
chattel is fit for that purpose. W. E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United
Airlines, Inc., 238 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
The concept of implied warranties covering the quality of goods is
firmly embedded in modern sales laws. These warranties provide the con-
sumer with a basis of relief for unsuitable or defective merchandise.2 Un-
der the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, which has been adopted in Florida,'
a seller, who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind, warrants that
the goods will be of merchantable quality.4 In addition, a seller who knows
the particular purpose for which an article is to be used and also knows
that the buyer is relying on his (the seller's) expertise in furnishing a
suitable article, warrants that the goods will be fit for that purpose.5
There is, however, no justification for the assertion that because
warranties are implied in sales cases, the courts are precluded from imply-
ing such warranties in non-sales cases.6 In fact, a lease (or bailment for
hire) 7 differs from a sale only in the contemplated future return of the
chattel: a sale transfers ownership in exchange for a price while a bail-
ment for hire transfers mere possession in exchange for a price.' Never-
theless, because a lease is not technically the equivalent of a sale, judges
1. United Airlines, Inc. v. W. E. Johnson Equip. Co., 227 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
2. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoL M. L. REV.
653, n.1 (1957).
3. The sales warranties are found in FLA. STAT. §§ 672.312 to 672.318 (1969).
4. IMPLIED WARRANTY: MERCHANTABILITY: USAGE OF TRADE.
(1) A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314; FLA. STAT. § 672.314 (1969).
5. IMPLIED WARRANTY: FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular pur-
pose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315; FLA. STAT. § 672.315 (1969).
6. Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 653.
7. In general, legal sources have used "bailment for hire" and "lease" interchangeably to
mean temporary possession in exchange for a price. While BiAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th
ed. 1957) makes the distinction that a bailment for hire is a contract by which the bailor
pays "an adequate recompense for the safe-keeping of the thing intrusted to the custody of
the bailee" (at 179) while a lease is a "grant of use and possession, in consideration of some-
thing to be rendered" (at 1035), it is submitted that this is an overly technical distinction.
Comment, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. REv. 127, n.3 (1968). The terms will be used interchangeably herein.
8. Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 655 n.16.
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have encountered problems when attempting to extend the warranty pro-
tections. Courts have been more willing to make the extension when deal-
ing with a dangerous instrumentality, recognizing that the same elements
that justify warranty imposition in sales cases were present. However,
with the increasing responsibility which has been imposed on the seller of
goods, and with the increasing numbers of rental businesses, ° parallel rea-
soning has been applied to place the risk of harm on the one who places
such goods into the mainstream of a commercial society." It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that as the courts appreciate the artificiality of the
sales-lease distinction, the concept of implied warranty has been recog-
nized in the lease situation. 2 The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE itself
alludes to the possibility of such an extension.' 3 Encyclopedias 4 and legal
periodicals 5 have frequently noted the analogy with favor, as has the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS' 6 and such distinguished authorities as
9. See note 12 infra.
10. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212 A.2d 769,
776 (1965), the court takes judicial notice of the growth of the business of renting motor
vehicles, trucks, and cars for pleasure.
11. See, e.g., Brown, Rights and Duties of Bailor and Bailee Under the Law of Pennsyl-
vania, 18 TEMP. L.Q. 199 (1944); Farnsworth, supra note 2 at 653; Comment, The Exten-
sion of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, supra note 7 at 128; Comment, Implied
Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel Leases, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 115; Comment,
Bailee's Rights Against Bailor-A Look at the Developments, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 421
(1967) ; Notes, 31 IND. L.J. 367 (1956), 17 MINN. L. REv. 210 (1933), 2 VAND. L. REv. 675
(1949); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850, 854 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (truck) ; Eastern Motor Express, Inc. v. A. Maschmeijer, Jr., Inc., 247 F.2d 826 (2d
Cir. 1957) (drums); Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart, 237 N.Y. 30, 142 N.E. 342 (1923)
(hoist); Mowbray v. Merryweather, [1895] 2 Q.B. 640 (C.A.) (chain); Leach v. French, 69
Me. 389 (1879) (horse) ; Sims v. Chance, 7 Tex. 561 (1852) (slave).
13. Although section 2-313 is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as a part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections
of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts
or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate cir-
cumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself
the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the
sale of their contents.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 2.
14. See 8 Am. Jua. 2d Bailments § 144 (1962); 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 25 (1962). The
general principle, in the words of 8 Am. JuR. 2D Bailments § 144, is:
[In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the bailor of a chattel to be used
by the bailee for a particular purpose known to the bailor, impliedly warrants the
reasonable suitability of the chattel for the bailee's known use of it.
15. See note 11 supra.
16. This can be seen by a reading of two sections of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1964) in conjunction.
CHATTEL KNOWN TO BE DANGEROUS FOR INTENDED USE:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the owner or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
1971]
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Williston 17 and Prosser.18
Florida's position on implied warranty reflects the principles dis-
cussed herein. In 1914, the Florida Supreme Court, in Williamson v. Phil-
lipoff,9 held that because the lessor of a lighter knew the specific purpose
for which the lighter was to be used, he (the lessor) was liable for dam-
ages on the basis of an implied warranty of fitness. In 1963, the third dis-
trict retreated from this position in Brookshire v. Florida Bendix Co.,20
and held that the duty of a bailor of a coin-operated washing machine ex-
tended only to a "duty on his part to exercise due care to furnish an
article in a reasonably safe condition."'" Nonetheless, the Williamson
theory that the doctrine of implied warranty has application even to
products which are the subject of a bailment, was re-adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1968 in the case of Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co. 22
Thus, the decision reached in the instant case is a rejection of the limited
liability espoused in Brookshire and an affirmation of the position taken
in Williamson and echoed in the dictum of Toombs, that the lessor's lia-
bility does include a warranty of fitness under appropriate circumstances.
The court notes the adoption by Florida of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE .21 It then discusses the reasons for extending such principles to lease
transactions: (a) protection of the consumer in an era of expansion of
rental enterprises on the basis of public policy; (b) reliance on the ex-
pertise of the lessor due to the contemplation of temporary possession;
(c) greater ability on the part of the lessor to sustain and distribute the
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1964).
LESSORS OF CHATTELS KNOWN TO BE DANGEROUS:
A lessor who leases a chattel for the use of others, knowing or having reason to
know that it is or is likely to be dangerous for the purpose for which it is to be
used, is subject to liability as a supplier of the chattel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 407 (1964).
17. One who lets property for hire may reasonably be subjected to the same implied
and constructive warranties as one who sells goods. . . .Analogy with the law of
sales justifies the further statement that if the hirer reasonably relied on the bailor's
superior skill or knowledge in furnishing suitable property, the latter would be liable
even though in fact ignorant of the defects in the goods which he furnished.
4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1041 (4th ed. 1967).
18. It frequently is said that the bailor of a chattel for hire impliedly warrants its
fitness for the bailee's use. . . .No reason suggests itself to prevent the ultimate
extension of such liability, subject to all of the limitations now found in the case of
sales, to any person who furnishes goods under a contract.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964).
19. 66 Fla. 549, 64 So. 269 (1914).
20. 153 So.2d 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
21. Id. at 58.
22. 208 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1968).
23. 238 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 1970).
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loss as one of the hazards of doing business.24 Whether or not the war-
ranty of fitness arises will therefore depend, as in the sales transaction, on
the totality of the commercial setting. This setting includes, but is not
limited to, such factors as expertise of the lessor, reliance by the lessee,
and the general character of the lessor's business.2 5 In conclusion, the
court states a rule which echoes the language of the UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE,
26
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the leased
chattel is required and that the lessee is relying upon the lessor's
skill or judgment to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there
is an implied warranty that the chattel shall be fit for such
purpose.27
In the opinion of this writer, the position taken by the Supreme Court
of Florida in the case at bar is a realistic one which recognizes the de-
mands of a commercial society in which greater numbers of people are
leasing rather than purchasing. Since the sale-lease distinction is, at best,
an artificial one, there is little justification for not applying the same
theory of liability in both situations. It is clear that the movement towards
extending warranty liability in chattel lease cases will necessitate greater
protection for the lessee. It is clear that the principles of the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE encourage and afford an ideal and convenient means
for the development of this line of judicial reasoning.
KAREN BETH KAY
IMPEACHMENT OF A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE:
THE DOOR IS OPEN
The defendant, Viven Harris, was charged with the sale of heroin.
After arrest but without having been given the Miranda warnings, he
made certain statements to the police. These statements, concerning what
the defendant had sold-heroin or baking powder-were introduced into
evidence at defendant's trial for impeachment purposes to contradict parts
of his direct testimony. The jury was instructed to consider these state-
ments only in the context of the defendant's credibility and not as an ad-
mission or evidence of guilt. Harris was found guilty. The Supreme Court
of New York affirmed.' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per
curiam opinion holding that notice need not be given to a defendant before
24. Id. at 100.
25. Id.
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. See note 5 supra.
27. 238 So.2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
1. 31 A.D.2d 828 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969).
